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3 Humanitarian Disaster Response: Understanding Aid Rejection
Communities the world over continue to be alarmingly vulnerable to natural hazards, 
leading to no shortage of devastating consequences. Whether or not climate change 
brings forth an increasingly ferocious variety of hazards, actors involved in disaster 
response will still face a multiplicity of challenges to delivering lifesaving aid. For 
instance, humanitarian organizations sometimes face the challenge of overcoming 
the reluctance of disaster affected states to accept their assistance. When disasters 
extensively overwhelm state capacity the refusal of external assistance can have 
serious ramifications for those affected. Despite the stakes, research surrounding 
aid rejection in these contexts is limited. This analysis sheds more light on why aid 
rejection occurs and highlights to humanitarian organizations and other researchers 
the fundamental considerations to develop an understanding on this subject.
A synthesis of existing research on disaster response reveals the very tangible 
political risk that disaster affected states face when engaging with international 
offers of assistance. It is in the effort to mitigate this political risk to their legitimacy 
that states may ultimately decide to reject aid. A few key state characteristics 
such as response capacity, level of external intervention and domestic politics 
may also amplify this risk, resulting in a higher likelihood that external aid is 
rejected. This analysis engages with these factors to determine their validity 
and relevancy to humanitarian practitioners seeking to develop the appropriate 
organizational strategies.
In an effort to better understand aid rejection a disaster dataset was developed 
based on the concept that disasters with higher visibility on the international scene 
present a higher level of political risk for an affected state, and therefore have the 
highest likelihood of resulting in cases of aid rejection. However, in analysing disasters 
that met this criterion over a 10 year period the research found no instances where 
external aid was universally and indiscriminately rejected. This is not to say that there 
were no cases where an affected state rejected assistance from a particular party but 
that even in these instances those states did accept aid from some other source. 
The implication of these findings is that states affected by natural borne disasters are 
likely to accept external offers of assistance so long as those offers carry a manageable 
level of political risk. Humanitarian organizations should therefore consider how they 
can mitigate the political risk they might present to an affected state as part of their 
disaster response strategy.
ABSTRACT
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the actions taken by its relevant domestic actors during 
the disaster. This insider knowledge, usually consisting 
of politically sensitive information, might often be 
outside the grasp of international researchers. In terms 
of terminological minutia, there is also considerable 
ambiguity surrounding the classification of disaster 
aid. Is a state considered an “aid rejecter” if it refuses 
offers of assistance from just one other state? If not, how 
many offers of assistance must it reject in order to be 
considered as such? Can analysists equate the discreet 
acceptance of monetary assistance with well-publicized 
transfers of material resources? Add the convolution of 
disaster response mechanisms available to states at the 
bilateral, regional and international level, not to mention 
the intricacies of domestic disaster response politics 
and these questions become increasingly complex. For 
good measure, consider also the subjective nature of 
even defining a disaster event. The Centre for Research 
on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), regarded as 
one of the most respectable stewards of disaster data, 
puts forth the following definition of a disaster:
“Situation or event, which overwhelms local capacity, 
necessitating a request to national or international 
level for external assistance” (CRED 2019). 
Unsurprisingly, problems arise when a divergence 
of opinion exists between the affected state and 
international actors in determining the necessity or 
magnitude of external assistance required.
Suffice to say that a multitude of factors contribute 
to making the study of aid rejection a complicated 
endeavour. While acknowledging these analytical 
barriers, in fact precisely because of them, it is the 
purpose of this research to contribute towards shaping 
a more foundational understanding of aid rejection. 
The analysis hopes to achieve this through three 
main objectives:
1. To provide a summary on the existing body of research 
on aid rejection
2. To extrapolate the most relevant indicators of aid
rejection for humanitarian practitioners
3. To develop an accurate dataset model and analytical
approach for studying aid rejection
These objectives will each comprise a section of the 
analysis which together will form its structure, followed 
by a summary of the key conclusions.
Introduction
The notion that the world is entering a period of 
increased exposure to natural hazards due to climate 
change is becoming near ubiquitous throughout global 
policy discussions. The humanitarian sector as a 
collective has been especially active in emphasizing the 
consequences of this phenomenon (New Humanitarian, 
11 March 2018). This concern stems from the prediction 
that climate change will progressively increase the 
frequency and severity of natural hazards thereby 
adversely affecting the communities most vulnerable 
to them (Maietta, Kennedy & Bourse 2018, p. 21). If 
this notion should prove valid, which recent weather 
patterns seem to substantiate (Oxfam International 
2019), then local, national and international disaster 
response strategies should be of ever increasing 
importance. Given also that climate change is a global 
phenomenon, cooperation at the international level 
might be of particular importance as an opportunity for 
progress. It is therefore troubling that research suggests 
states are increasingly likely to reject international 
aid in the wake of natural borne disasters (Maietta, 
Kennedy & Bourse 2018, p. 16, 115). A stark example 
of this trend was observed following the string of 
disasters that struck Indonesia in July and September 
of 2018. Whether the national government was justified 
in actively rejecting foreign aid is up for debate but 
the discernible strain on state capacity in the wake of 
the disasters certainly raises the question of whether 
this aid could have facilitated the disaster response 
(Rose 2018). While Indonesia did eventually acquiesce 
to a limited and controlled stream of international 
assistance, the apparent reluctance with which it did so 
was not a promising sign for international humanitarian 
responders. However, aid rejection following natural 
borne disasters is not unique to Indonesia nor to the 
present. The seemingly increasing prevalence of aid 
rejection should be worrying though considering the 
substantial efforts that have already been made towards 
facilitating aid acceptance in these contexts.
If aid rejection can indeed be expected to rise, this 
trend could have significant costs for humanitarian 
organizations and their potential beneficiaries. Given 
the probable consequences more efforts should be 
made to better understand aid rejection in the context 
of these disasters. Unfortunately, the body of research 
on aid rejection remains relatively limited.  Especially 
lacking are analyses on the perspectives of states 
affected by natural borne disasters that choose to reject 
aid. While theories abound on states’ motives for doing 
so, no comprehensive predictive models have emerged 
that capture the widespread berth of relevant factors. 
Most datasets and analytical models developed for the 
purpose of researching aid rejection are also regrettably 
limited in their scope. This is not surprising given the 
general opaqueness of disaster aid flow despite several 
major efforts for increased transparency.
Besides raw data any truly substantive analysis of 
aid rejection will also most likely require in-depth 
knowledge and understanding of an affected state, 
including its disaster response policies, mechanisms and 
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Section One:  
Why States Reject Aid
If there is a preformed explanation for aid rejection 
it perhaps lies in the image of a rogue state, atop of 
which sits an incontrovertible dictator, spurning the 
helping hand of the international community following 
a disaster and insisting that its people will rely instead 
on their uniquely superior power of self-sufficiency. 
Inconveniently, this image is a misrepresentation. Travis 
Nelson (2010, p. 395) in his research actually finds that 
regime type is not a determining factor in aid acceptance 
following natural borne disasters. In the wake of a 
cyclone a fairly elected representative government might 
be just as likely to reject aid as a brutal autocrat. Rather, 
the duration of time since a given state has experienced 
a significant regime transition has proved much more 
indicative of aid rejection (Nelson 2010, p. 395). In this 
theory, states view the acceptance of aid, especially 
following a highly publicized disaster, as an impactor 
on their legitimacy. Therefore, in periods of regime 
transition where their legitimacy is predictably most 
vulnerable, states are more likely to view acceptance of 
aid as a political risk they cannot afford. For example, 
Nelson notes how Myanmar’s transition in progress from 
a military junta to a democracy was a key factor in why 
the regime rejected international assistance immediately 
following Cyclone Nargis in 2008 (Nelson 2010, p. 396).
It is this notion of aid acceptance as a political risk 
which is especially important to recognize and is 
advanced by other research to greater and lesser 
degrees. What exactly is meant by the term “political 
risk” though? Within this analytical framework the term 
will refer to exposure to a potentially negative impact 
on state legitimacy. Since it is not within the scope of 
this paper to delve into the various contested definitions 
available for “state legitimacy” this analysis will satisfy 
itself with a common and general meaning which is the 
acceptance of the state’s authority over its population. 
What is interesting to note is that political risk can be 
said to have two aspects: international and domestic. 
The international aspect of political risk can be seen 
as representing an external threat and the domestic 
an internal threat to state legitimacy. Although both 
aspects are doubtlessly intertwined, understanding 
them as two separate elements will assist in reviewing 
the relevant body of research.
Beginning with the international aspect of political risk, 
some research has found that states are more likely 
to reject aid if they perceive it as an attempt from an 
international actor to meddle in their domestic affairs 
(Allan & O’Donnell 2013, p. 47). In this case political risk 
might be interpreted as a threat to sovereignty. Some 
reports claim that disaster response can actually be a 
battleground for state sovereignty, with the affected 
state fending off incursions disguised in the form 
of aid (Bandopadhyay 2019). For instance, the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti is a prime example of a state’s 
agency being sidelined by an international response 
(Rodgers 2013). Considering the basic responsibilities a 
state holds to care for its population it is certainly not 
invalid to conclude that the assumption of some of this 
responsibility by a foreign power during a disaster is an 
infringement on this sovereignty.
Applying Rachel Brewer’s theories on state reputation, 
aid rejection can also be understood as part of a 
realist calculus that states perform (Brewster 2009). 
In certain cases, states determine they have more to 
gain in the international arena by rejecting aid, or that 
at the very least their reputation will not suffer from 
doing so. A possible explanation for why states might 
interpret aid rejection as beneficial is that from a certain 
perspective the capacity to unilaterally respond to a 
disaster marks a key divide between “developed” and 
“developing” countries. From this viewpoint, to accept 
foreign assistance is to admit a lack of independence, 
which can be interpreted as a lack of power. Contrast 
the idea of the United States and Haiti calling out to the 
international community for help following a disaster in 
their respective countries. One would be a shock and 
the other an expectation. Countries such as India and 
Turkey which in the last few decades have striven to 
transition from “recipient” to “donor” status (Smith 2011), 
or another growing regional power like Indonesia might 
be particularly keen to showcase their independence by 
rejecting aid.
For the governments of these countries, responding to 
a natural borne disaster under an international spotlight 
might actually present an opportunity to showcase their 
increased capability as a state. This is especially true 
considering the usually large involvement of military 
assets in disaster response. The rapid and effective 
mobilization of soldiers and military equipment in 
these contexts does not leave much to the imagination 
if rival states were considering what other means that 
force might be deployed for. From a humanitarian 
perspective though, that states are increasingly capable 
of unilaterally responding to disasters is theoretically an 
encouraging trend (UNESCAP 2017). However, real issues 
arise when states may prioritize the showcasing of 
independence over acknowledging when a disaster has 
overwhelmed their capacities, a point further discussed 
in section two. In terms of the international aspect of 
political risk, two factors emerge as significant. The first 
is the risk to sovereignty presented by the usurpation 
or perceived usurpation of the affected state’s 
responsibilities by an external actor. The second is the 
risk to a state’s international reputation by appearing 
weak or incapable in the face of a disaster.
On the domestic front, the acceptance of aid can also 
be seen to have significant political consequences. 
Parallel to the risk to its international reputation, a 
state’s population could view their government as 
weak or inept depending on its response to a disaster 
(Cole, Healy & Werker 2012, p.167-181). There could be 
additional consequences when political contenders 
are poised to take advantage of an unfavorable disaster 
response narrative (Allan & O’Donnell 2013, p. 47). 
A good example in the United States is how the Bush 
administration’s handling of Hurricane Katrina’s 
6 Humanitarian Disaster Response: Understanding Aid Rejection
devastation of New Orleans in 2005 became a rallying 
cry for the rival Democratic Party (Walsh 2015). Given 
the political risk of not meeting the needs of their 
disaster affected population though, it might be assumed 
that states would be more likely to accept aid in order 
to bolster any national response. As Kent, Armstrong 
and Obrecht (2013) note in their research however, the 
unknown factor of aid acceptance is often seen as the 
greater political risk. It therefore probably behooves 
states to ensure as much control over the management 
of a disaster response, foreign aid pouring in is not 
exactly conducive to that effort. However, as these 
researchers note, governments, comprised of an array 
of individuals facing an extremely stressful situation, 
cannot always be expected to act rationally (Kent, 
Armstrong & Obrecht 2013) despite perceiving disaster 
management as a key impactor of domestic support and 
stability (Rubin 2019). Sometimes perhaps, aid rejection, 
rather than a conscious policy, occurs simply out of 
the mismanagement and bungling pervasive in any 
emergency context.
Returning to the theories and frameworks purporting 
deliberate aid refusal, Nelson’s research (2010) is 
again valuable in building a coherent foundation 
for understanding state actions. For example, while 
Indonesia was not undergoing a significant regime 
change in 2018 one could assume the upcoming 
presidential election in 2019 was surely a factor for 
the government as they managed two major disaster 
responses, demonstrating perhaps that regime change 
and government transition can be similarly indicative 
of aid rejection. In fact, research surrounding voter 
behavior has concluded that constituents are influenced 
by not just the disaster response but the occurrence of 
the natural hazard itself (Cole, Healy & Werker 2012, p. 
16). This makes increasingly clear the kind of political 
pressures a responding government faces in the attempt 
to overcome the negative bias already attached to them 
at the outset of a hazard event. Wooyeal Paik’s research 
(2010, p. 442) goes a step further in actually validating 
states’ treatment of aid acceptance as a political risk, 
pointing out several instances where government 
response to a disaster was inexorably linked to a 
subsequent regime change.
That governments are “right” to view international 
aid acceptance in this light may be uncomfortable to 
acknowledge for humanitarians whose main objective 
is the alleviation of suffering. However, as seasoned 
humanitarians already know, aid acceptance is politically 
charged and the practicalities of aid delivery will always 
be subject to some type of realpolitik.  The worrying 
trend would again be that these political barriers are 
mounting, a concept not without validity according 
to some emerging factors. The immediacy of media 
coverage when a disaster occurs and its rampant spread 
across social media platforms combined with waves 
of nationalism that increase pressure on governments 
to appear strong and independent are some such 
factors (Maietta, Kennedy & Bourse 2018, p. 16, 115). A 
more optimistic factor is the increasing capacity of 
certain disaster prone states, especially in the Asia 
Pacific region, which might be reducing the need for 
international aid thereby resulting in its rejection (ALNAP 
2010). What is clear is that humanitarian organizations 
will need to be ready to adapt to the changing realities of 
disaster response and should be wary of the dangerous 
bedfellows that nationalism and aid rejection may have 
become.
Section Two:  
Identifying States More Likely to Reject Aid
While an academic background on aid rejection is useful 
for developing an understanding of the topic, more 
operationally minded humanitarian practitioners might 
long for the practical conclusions. One particularly 
useful aspect of understanding aid rejection might 
be the capacity to identify states that are more likely 
to do so before disaster strikes. With this knowledge 
humanitarian organizations could appropriately tailor 
their strategies for identified states to be better placed 
to deliver aid. This analysis will seek to contribute 
in this regard and while it cannot claim to provide a 
predictive equation for determining any given state’s 
likelihood of rejecting aid, it should serve as a useful 
guide for identifying certain indicators that could help 
do so. Decision makers can use this information to 
develop more adaptive disaster response strategies 
as well as more effectively tailor the allocation of 
their resources. The analysis below covers three main 
theories, extrapolated from the reviewed research and 
other sources to highlight the indicators that may be 
most relevant for predicting aid rejection.
Capacity as an Indicator
Returning to the research, it was noted that states 
view aid acceptance as a political risk with significant 
international and domestic political impacts. Based on 
this understanding a general conclusion can be drawn 
that if states are able to avoid this political risk, they 
will (Carnegie & Dolan 2015, p. 3). In other words, if a 
state possesses the capacity to respond to a disaster 
without external aid it is very likely they will do so to 
mitigate this risk to their legitimacy. The inverse can be 
equally indicative, that is that states with less capacity 
for disaster response will more often find themselves 
in a position where the acceptance of aid is a necessity 
(Nelson 2010, p. 394). In this case, one need only look 
at an assessment of state capacity to determine the 
likelihood of aid rejection. For example, the severity 
of a natural hazard being equal, Austria should be 
more likely to reject aid than Afghanistan according to 
assessments of their disaster response capacity. Another 
way to simplify this notion would be that if a state truly 
needs aid, it will accept it. Obviously if that were always 
the case it would defeat the entire raison d’etre of this 
research and its counterparts but it is worth noting that 
this trend is generally true.
This may seem like a rather obvious set of conclusions 
but taken one step further it becomes a rather troubling 
one. Given that management of the political risk largely 
centres around perception, a state’s actual capacity may 
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be less important than its perceived capacity (Carnegie 
& Dolan 2015). In this case a state may reject external 
aid, forwarding the notion that it possesses the capacity 
to respond unilaterally, when in reality the disaster has 
exceeded its capacity. As researchers Allison Carnegie 
and Lindsay Dolan (2015, p. 3) note this maneuver can be 
accomplished (or attempted) when there is a plausible 
notion that the affected state might in fact possess the 
needed capacity. Drawing on these conclusions the 
states most likely to reject aid when their capacity has 
been overwhelmed would be those at high risk to natural 
hazards with passable levels of relevant coping capacity. 
These states are likely to experience the serious damage 
to life and property caused by natural hazards and 
possess enough capacity to justify a unilateral response. 
Taking the INFORM global risk index’s measures of 
both exposure and capacity, countries that fall in this 
category would include China, India, Iran, Mexico, Peru, 
the Philippines and Vietnam, with Indonesia falling 
just shy of being included on the list (INFORM 2018).1 
It is significant to note that more than a few of these 
intermediately vulnerable countries have rejected aid in 
the past.
State capacity as an indicator then offers a promising 
start to predicting aid acceptance behavior, although, 
it is ultimately an incomplete one. While it might be 
relatively accurate in determining that countries below 
a certain threshold of capacity will accept aid and 
others above a certain threshold reject it, predictability 
between these two thresholds becomes much less clear. 
There are also instances where countries with high 
capacity scores have accepted aid such as Japan and 
countries with low capacity scores rejected it such as 
Myanmar. Even establishing such thresholds would be 
highly dependent on the severity of a disaster leaving 
much to be desired in terms of predictive capability. Still, 
humanitarian organizations are encouraged to consider 
the identified intermediately vulnerable countries 
when developing their disaster response strategies as 
this theory would indicate a higher prevalence of aid 
rejection among them.
External Intervention as an Indicator
As was previously mentioned, the threat of external 
intervention can represent a significant political risk for 
a disaster affected country. If this is the case then higher 
levels of foreign interference in a country might indicate 
that country is more likely to accept aid, as this external 
threat to its legitimacy already exists and has either 
been voluntarily or involuntarily accepted. Conversely, 
countries with low levels of foreign interference would 
be more likely to balk at any international influence 
over their governance, even if it comes in the form of 
well-meaning aid. With this in mind, utilizing the Fund 
1 The analysis selected countries on the INFORM Global Risk Index 
with both an exposure to natural hazard score above 7.0 (High-
Very High) and a lack of coping capacity score between 3.2 and 4.6 
(Medium). Indonesia was only just disqualified with a lack of coping 
capacity score of 4.7.
for Peace’s Fragile States Index (2018) to assess the 
level of external intervention in a state could prove a 
useful method for determining the likelihood of aid 
acceptance.2 The theory is that countries with high 
levels of external intervention would be expected to 
accept aid and as the level of external intervention 
decreased so would the likelihood of aid acceptance.
As with state capacity this would probably not result in 
a perfectly linear predictive capability. While one could 
identify states with low levels of external intervention 
which would be more likely to reject aid it would 
be difficult to determine at what point the level of 
external intervention actually affects the likelihood of 
aid acceptance. Also similarly to state capacity, a good 
starting point for making this determination might be 
to focus on states which are transitioning from higher 
to lower levels of external intervention. States in this 
period might be particularly determined to avoid any 
international efforts which would hold them back from 
reaching a sought after, more complete autonomy. This 
might be especially true if external intervention did 
have any correlative relationship with state legitimacy, 
a higher level of intervention perhaps being indicative 
of a less commanding government and vice versa. A 
government attempting to assert its authority might 
then view curbing external intervention, certainly 
in the form of aid, as a means to do so. Whether the 
relationship between external intervention and state 
legitimacy can be isolated as correlative would be an 
interesting topic for further research and in fact has 
already been explored among various studies in the 
development sector, although not within the scope of 
disaster response as far this researcher is aware. What 
can be said though is that states with lower levels of 
external intervention are probably less likely to accept 
aid. While this again might appear a relatively simple 
conclusion to make it is an important one to elucidate in 
order to begin to establish tangible metrics with which 
to build predictive models.
Domestic Politics as an Indicator
The last potential indicator identified by this analysis 
concerns the theories centered on voter behavior in 
response to disasters. Several key conclusions have been 
reached surrounding this topic which are especially 
relevant. The first is that disaster response within a 
state can highly depend on the political importance 
of the affected area as Thomas Garrett and Russel 
Sobel (2003) found in their research on federal relief 
allocation in the United States. The implication of this 
is that national governments might be more intent on 
demonstrating a strong national response in areas 
where the political stakes are higher, likely increasing 
the aversion to accepting foreign aid into these areas. 
Although this is not yet a validated assumption, at the 
very least humanitarian organizations should be aware 
of this domestic political consideration. Perhaps making 
2  The Fund for Peace’s external intervention indicator takes into 
account development and humanitarian aid among other factors.
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extra efforts to integrate themselves under a national 
response in high political value areas or focusing their 
efforts in areas that might be more neglected following 
a disaster due to their political irrelevance.
Another assumption can be made based on the findings 
of Shawn Cole, Andrew Healy and Eric Werker (2012, p. 
22) who found that the political stakes for an incumbent 
government are higher when a disaster occurs in close 
proximity to an election. The temporal importance of 
a disaster response is reinforced by an earlier study by 
Healy, this time with Neil Malhorta, (2009) in which they 
determined the initial logistical response to a disaster 
may be the most significant in terms of electoral impact. 
Recalling Indonesia’s initial public rejection of aid which 
took place at a time when the upcoming presidential 
election was undoubtedly of political significance these 
points seem expressly relevant. It would therefore not 
be without reason for humanitarian organizations to 
assess a country’s domestic political situation within 
the identified contexts in order to determine a risk of 
aid rejection. The indicative theory being that countries 
in the midst of political transitions, whether they 
be planned in a stable democracy or represented by 
political unrest under an autocratic ruler, would be more 
likely to reject aid. This theory could compliment the 
concept of period-since-regime-transition advanced 
by Nelson as part of a dual assessment. One part linked 
to the transition of power within a political system and 
one on the transition between political systems. While 
various factors might make it difficult to operationalize 
this indicator in a predictive manner it might be best 
incorporated into the political analysis that is conducted 
prior to engaging in a disaster response.
Prioritization
This section has up to this point focused on specific 
indicators which might be useful for identifying 
risk of aid rejection. As part of the effort to assist 
humanitarian practitioners it might also prove sensible 
to introduce a decision making process as well. This 
process centers on prioritizing countries according to 
the likelihood of requiring more nuanced approaches 
should a disaster occur. In other words, which countries 
are more likely to be averse to accepting aid. That 
a country is likely to reject aid should not be the sole 
grounds for prioritization though. Rather, in line with 
the humanitarian principles, priority should be placed 
where rejecting aid would result in the greatest human 
cost. A practical way to calculate this could be to start 
with an assessment of country risk. In this case we 
can again take the INFORM Global Risk Index as our 
measure. An organization could focus on the top 10 
most at risk countries, or whatever global sample is 
relevant to the organization’s reach and resources. The 
next step would be to classify the countries on this list 
in terms of likelihood of aid acceptance. Priority would 
be given to countries with a combination of the highest 
risk and lowest likelihood of aid acceptance. From 
the subsequent ranking, organizations could identify 
specific countries or regions where they might require 
a more adaptive disaster response strategy. A simple 
process, yet one that could provide decision makers 
with a critically increased level of preparedness.
Section Three:  
Measuring Aid Rejection
One of the main issues this research seeks to contend 
with is the very manner in which aid rejection is analysed. 
After all, varying disaster and aid flow datasets as well 
as varying definitions of what constitutes aid rejection 
will undoubtedly produce varying results. While the 
numerous perspectives taken by other research each 
hold a degree of validity, by adapting new research 
methods this analysis seeks to expand the richness of 
understanding in this field. Moreover, beyond the focus 
of aid rejection this research should also contribute 
to the wider field of international relations in terms of 
capturing data on state decision making practices.
As with most related research this analysis recommends 
drawing on CRED’s Emergency Events Database 
(EM-DAT) as the basis for natural borne disaster data. 
This analysis found it best to limit the types of natural 
hazards included in the dataset to those that have an 
immediate impact on the affected state’s capacity and 
would subsequently warrant an immediate international 
response. The primary reason for doing so is that unlike 
in a protracted hazard such as a drought, a hazard 
with an immediate impact produces the specific and 
pronounced political risk that this analysis is concerned 
with. The state’s response to this risk is more measurable 
and definitive and therefore allows for a clearer form of 
insight into the state’s actions.
Where this research approach might begin to diverge 
from other frameworks is in determining the threshold 
for including these disasters into a dataset for measuring 
aid rejection. As the EM-DAT includes disasters with 
all magnitudes of human and material cost it casts too 
wide a net for identifying the instances of political risk 
posed by those disasters which could illicit aid refusal. 
The Austrian government for example is unlikely to face 
any serious political risk if faced by a storm that causes 
no casualties and limited economic damage. It would 
be unlikely to require outside assistance nor be offered 
it. How to determine the threshold where political risk 
is apparent then? Other research has taken the human 
death toll as a measure of a disaster’s severity and 
therefore the political risk it might present. This is based 
on the notion that a high death toll attracts the attention 
of an international audience and it is ultimately the 
high visibility of a disaster which increases the political 
pressure on states, sometimes bringing about the 
rejection of aid (Nelson 2010). Our research will adopt 
this notion and focus its scope on disasters which can 
be expected to illicit this type of visibility, in this case 
measured by media coverage. However, as research 
conducted by Thomas Eisensee and David Strömberg 
(2007) concluded, the number of human casualties 
required to make international news headlines fluctuates 
wildly depending on the source of the disaster. While an 
earthquake that kills two people is likely to be covered 
by international news outlets a landslide that kills a 
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hundred times that amount probably won’t be (Eisensee 
& Strömberg 2007). This being considered, instead of 
setting a rather arbitrary death count as the standard 
for inclusion in the dataset this research framework will 
adopt the hazard specific metrics revealed by Eisensee 
and Strömberg as found in the table below.
Table 1. Number of deaths expected to illicit international news 
coverage by hazard type.







Source: Eisensee and Strömberg, (2007).
This established threshold therefore identifies disasters 
that should be more likely to compel aid rejection 
based at least on the international aspect of political 
risk. While one would assume domestic audiences 
would have lower casualty thresholds when applying 
the equivalent pressure on their governments the 
international threshold  should sufficiently capture 
what this research is after.  A compilation of disasters 
that are perceived as severe enough to warrant political 
risk. As far as the temporal parameters this research will 
capture a period of 10 years, from 2008 to 2018. This 
period provided a significant amount of data points with 
contemporary relevancy.3 The resulting dataset included 
183 disasters for analysis, with a large share of these 
being earthquakes. The UN’s Financial Tracking Service 
(FTS) is an excellent resource to measure the relevant 
aid f low for this dataset, and in most cases it allows 
researchers to relate aid from specific donors of all types 
to specific disasters in an affected state. For the purpose 
of analysing aid rejection this provides tangible data on 
when aid is sent which is a more desirable alternative 
than relying on rhetoric in the international arena to 
determine if a state did or did not accept it.
In terms of the actual analysis the principal shift that 
this approach takes from other related research is that 
it focuses on a much stricter definition of aid rejection. 
3  And also focuses on the time period after the adoption of the 
IFRC’s Guidelines on the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation 
of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance or 
“IDRL”. The IDRL guidelines represent a major policy milestone 
in facilitating the delivery of disaster aid and by analysing the time 
period following their introduction onto the international stage in 
2007 we might gain a better understanding of how effective the 
initiative has been.
In doing so the intent is to discern the patterns of aid 
rejection which are most relevant to humanitarian 
organizations seeking to deliver disaster aid. After all, 
if Iran rejects aid from Israel following a devastating 
earthquake does that action reveal an established policy 
of aid refusal on the part of the Iranian government 
which might impact humanitarian organizations? In all 
likelihood it is only telling of the animosity that exists 
between the two states. To label Iran an aid rejecter in 
this case would be misleading if it was in fact accepting 
other, less antagonistic, offers of assistance. The aid 
rejection that truly impacts humanitarian operations 
is the broad and sweeping rejection which seemingly 
makes no effort to distinguish between an INGO and 
an international rival. In these instances the affected 
state makes a determined effort based on a conscious 
policy to refuse outside assistance regardless of where it 
might come from and how crucially it might be needed. 
In order to identify these specific instances the analysis 
has developed three benchmarks related to aid refusal 
which a state must meet in order to fall into the category 
of aid rejecter.
The first is whether the affected state accepted aid 
from any foreign entity which was directly related to 
the specified disaster. If it did, it cannot be considered 
an aid rejecter. This would mean that even if a disaster-
struck United States only accepted aid from its 
benevolent Canadian neighbour and rejected all other 
offers of assistance it would not be classified as an aid 
rejecter. The logic of this standard is that if an affected 
state accepts aid from even one outside entity, whether 
governmental or not, it is displaying a willingness 
to receive assistance so long as that assistance is 
within an acceptable level of political risk. For our 
hypothetically disaster-struck United States, Canada 
might have presented the only politically acceptable 
donor option for a variety of reasons. Perhaps the US 
government doesn’t view Canada as a threat, or the 
two countries have a long history of friendly relations 
which mitigates any notion of less than altruistic 
intent. Perhaps the consideration is even based more 
on the American public’s favourable view of Canadians 
in general and accepting Canadian aid in the wake of 
a disaster could build a favourable disaster response 
narrative for incumbent government officials in an 
upcoming election. The same could be applied to non-
governmental entities. Whether there is a religious 
affiliation, long standing relationship or a particular 
organizational framework, a certain combination of 
factors could make one specific organization more 
appealing as a donor or partner for disaster response. 
As was previously noted, this differs from other 
approaches to measuring aid rejection where a single 
or set number of rejections substantiate classifying a 
state as an aid rejecter. Simply but paradoxically put, 
a state is not an aid rejecter just because it rejects aid 
from certain entities, so long as it accepts aid from at 
least one other entity. By tilting the focus more towards 
instances of aid acceptance we should gain a better 
understanding of the kind of assistance an affected 
state wants rather than what it doesn’t. Deepening this 
perspective would allow humanitarian organizations 
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to more suitably tailor their response based on the 
distinctive wishes of a particular state.
If an affected state did not accept aid from any foreign 
entity for the specified disaster then the second criteria 
applied is whether it did so for another disaster that took 
place in the same calendar year. This allows the research 
to control for disasters which definitively did not 
necessitate outside assistance. An earthquake that kills 
two people in China might spark international intrigue 
but given that country’s scale and resources it would 
probably not result in a f lood of international offers 
of assistance and therefore present no opportunity to 
reject such offers. However, if in the same year a flood 
swept through China and killed thousands of people the 
offers would likely come pouring in. If China accepted 
assistance in this case it would imply that it might have 
done so for the theoretical earthquake if the assistance 
had been needed. Regardless, if an affected state chooses 
to accept disaster aid in the same calendar year as other 
disasters for which it did not then the implication is that 
the political risk of aid acceptance is not so great as to 
spur a policy of blanket refusal. Therefore, if an affected 
state accepted aid for any newsworthy disaster in the 
same calendar year as another newsworthy disaster 
then it will not be considered an aid rejecter.
Should an affected state not accept aid for any 
newsworthy disaster in the calendar year the next 
criteria to be applied is whether it actively and publicly 
rejected aid from the international community. Once 
again we must acknowledge the general opaqueness 
which surrounds the flow of aid and prevents a clear 
determination of when aid rejection takes place. Offers 
of assistance between governments made behind closed 
doors will most likely not be reflected onto the public 
stage. However, when a disaster clearly exceeds the 
affected state’s capacity resulting in a massive loss of life 
and/or level of human suffering, that state’s rejection of 
plainly needed assistance is bound to make headlines. 
Since it is these instances humanitarian organizations 
are probably most concerned with, this final benchmark 
would identify them, relying on news coverage of the 
rejection as the indicator. This factor also helps control 
for disasters that again, while newsworthy, do not 
definitively exceed the capacity of the affected state and 
therefore do not result in a solicitation of aid.
Preliminary Findings
Applying these parameters to our dataset of 183 disasters 
this analysis found 0 instances where an affected state 
met the criteria to be considered an aid rejecter. The 
point should be emphasized here that these findings do 
not indicate that individual instances of aid rejection 
do not occur, they absolutely do. What these findings 
do illustrate is that on no occasion did an affected state 
deny all sources of external assistance. While there 
were 32 cases (17%) where the affected state did not 
accept aid, in none of these cases did the analysis find 
evidence that those states displayed an overt effort 
to reject all offers of international assistance. This 
was most likely due to the fact that the affected state 
possessed the internal capacity to adequately handle 
the disaster response, at least based on the relatively 
low number of deaths in these cases (CRED 2019). Of 
the 32, only four cases (2%) represented disasters with 
a death toll higher than 50 and only one case (<0.5%) 
with a death toll higher than 100; a series of wildfires 
in Australia in 2009 (CRED 2019). Given the high level of 
disaster response capacity in Australia it is reasonable to 
assume it did not require outside assistance. However, 
it is still possible that within these 32 cases a real need 
for external assistance existed and assistance was 
offered but refused. This refusal might not have been 
identified by the analysis if it did not make international 
headlines. It is worth reiterating again the state of 
muddiness surrounding aid flow. While a case by case 
analysis would certainly help clarify this the fact that 
none of these cases represented major disasters in 
terms of human loss seems to substantiate the original 
conclusion. The affected states probably did not require 
external assistance.
Also of note is the fact that both Myanmar in 2008 and 
Indonesia in 2018 accepted international assistance 
following the respective disasters that impacted them. 
Myanmar’s rejection of aid following Cyclone Nargis is 
often touted as a textbook example of aid rejection as is 
Indonesia’s following the twin disasters in 2018. While 
much discourse surrounds the very real proclamations 
that each government made and followed through on 
about rejecting aid much less attention is paid to the 
manner in which each state accepted it. In Myanmar’s 
case the channelling of aid through the regional 
body ASEAN rather than a seemingly more hostile 
international apparatus was a crucial condition for its 
acceptance, a process which certainly decreased the 
level of political risk faced by the transitioning regime 
(Allan & O’Donnell 2013). In Indonesia’s case it may 
have been more a matter of controlling the scope of 
international assistance in order to make the political 
risk more manageable. It is worth noting that the first 
UNHRD shipment to the country didn’t occur until 10 
days after the disaster, a noticeably slower rate than 
most other responses (UNHRD 2019). Perhaps delaying 
the influx of aid was one way the Indonesian government 
sought to manage the political risk by ensuring that the 
national response was already well under way before 
an international response could take place. Similarly, in 
certain cases affected states were quite discriminatory 
with where they accepted aid from. Russia was such an 
example, accepting aid almost exclusively from close 
political allies or famously neutral Switzerland following 
a disaster (UNOCHA 2019). There were numerous such 
examples of this discrimination but the point being that 
the findings indicate states affected by these sudden 
onset hazards will ultimately accept international 
assistance if it is needed.
This perspective shifts the angle of focus onto successful 
aid deliveries rather than failures which in turn opens up 
the possibility for humanitarian organizations to mitigate 
the risk of aid rejection. For example, what factors about 
an aid delivery from Belarus make it palatable for the 
Russian government? Is it possible for a humanitarian 
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organization to mirror these factors? Returning to 
the case of Myanmar, might regional bodies present 
an opportunity to increase the efficacy of aid delivery 
(Global Humanitarian Assistance 2018)? Hopefully, other 
researchers will seek to answer these questions and in 
doing so assist humanitarian organizations in placing 
themselves in ideal positions to deliver aid when and 
where it is most needed.
Conclusion
This analysis began with a review of previous research 
surrounding the politics of disaster response which 
yielded several insights. First and foremost is the 
reality that disasters are both inherently political and 
highly charged with potential political impacts. As 
such, states are deeply aware of how their management 
of a disaster presents a political risk both in terms of 
their international status and domestic legitimacy. It 
is likely the attempt to mitigate this political risk that 
results in a state rejecting external aid. At least in 
terms of rhetoric this seems especially true for states 
that view themselves as “up and coming” on the world 
stage and may hold an increased desire to showcase 
competence and independence to international and 
domestic audiences. Even when a disaster exceeds their 
capacity they might still choose to reject aid for fear of 
political consequences.  Perhaps more insightful is the 
notion that states that are intermediately vulnerable, 
in that they face high hazard exposure coupled with 
moderate capacity, are more likely to experience both 
the need for aid and the “need” to reject it. Capacity is 
therefore a useful indicator in determining likelihood of 
aid acceptance.
The level of external intervention in a state was also 
found to be an positive indicator for measuring the 
political risk of accepting aid. States with high levels 
of external intervention are likely to accept aid as the 
political risk to them is probably negligible. However, 
states with median levels of external intervention 
seem to face a potentially significant political risk 
when deciding to accept aid. This could be due to 
their transitory status between “donor” and “recipient” 
countries, with the acceptance of aid compromising 
their movement towards the donor side. Given that 
aid rejection is closely tied to a state’s desire to appear 
competent in the eyes of their own constituency, it is 
also likely that domestic politics heavily influence a 
state’s decision to accept aid.
Capacity, external intervention and domestic politics 
form a strong foundation for predicting the likelihood 
of aid rejection. The findings of this research suggest 
that the barriers to aid acceptance should not be 
insurmountable though. Humanitarian organizations 
that possess the foresight to identify potential risk of aid 
rejection, the capability to adapt themselves accordingly 
and the will to build equitable partnerships should 
ultimately be among the most effective facilitators of 
aid. Considering the potential trend for increased aid 
rejection and the mounting consequences of climate 
change there is ample impetus for organizations to strive 
towards developing the most comprehensive disaster 
response strategies possible. The true challenge perhaps 
lies in upholding the humanitarian principles while doing 
so. Compromising the principles of humanity, neutrality, 
independence or impartiality for the sake of mitigating 
the political risk faced by the affected state would be a 
precarious path indeed.
While this analysis has decidedly focused on a negative 
connotation of political risk, there is undoubtedly a 
positive implication. Governments that effectively 
manage disaster responses, to include responses that 
make use of international assistance to bolster national 
efforts, stand to enhance their legitimacy as they fulfill 
arguably the most essential governmental responsibility 
of protecting life. That being said, it cannot help 
but be emphasized that the true key to fulfilling this 
fundamental responsibility lies in preventing disasters 
from taking place in the first place and investing in the 
necessary measures to reduce risk and vulnerability. 
Prevention might offer the most politically neutral 
opportunity for reducing disaster likelihood and 
should therefore sit within any truly effective disaster 
response strategy.
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